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Abstract
“Reputation systems” are widely used in e-commerce, crowdsourcing and crowdfunding
platforms, as well as in a multitude of different web-based services. However, recent
works stressed how the attribution of the reputation could be unrelated to the actual
behaviour of the users. The aim of this study was to investigate which factors influenced
the formation and the maintenance of the reputation in an online multiplayer game. Our
study provided further and novel evidence of how people greatly rely on the previous
acquired reputation of their interactors, whenever they are asked to rate them after a
game’s interaction. The “Reputational heuristics” adopted by players appeared to neglect
the actual interactor’s behaviour, in favor of a judgement in accordance with his
behaviour.
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1 Introduction
In virtual environments reputation based systems are nowadays very common and
diffused in an increasing multitude of web based services. Information and
Communication Technologiesn (ICTs) have facilitated the proliferation of systems based
on online feedbacks [1]. For instance, e-commerce sites (e.g., e-Bay, Amazon) rely
massively to them in order to discover the sellers’ reliability, thus ensuring their own
survival in the labour market. The same companies increasingly recognize the benefits
associated with having a good reputation, and employ a considerable amount of
resources and energy in reputation management practices [2, 3, 4]. Indeed, reputation
seems able to exert an influence upon people behaviours, judgments, feelings and
thoughts. Already Semmann et al. [5] noticed how people tended to be influenced greatly
by the reputation of their interactors. Interestingly, also a huge set of projects concerning
Collective Intelligence platforms owe their success to the ability of reputation systems to
engage people and keep their interest alive through gamification [6]. For istance, the
possibility to get badges, to climb charts or to acquire a certain level is what allowed
Waze (i.e., a crowdsourced traffic monitoring application) to work and to be appreciated
by a large number of users. The same results have been reached by applications related to
education and learning goals, such as Duolingo and Khan Academy. However, despite all
the aforementioned projects use reputation systems for their own well-functioning,
barely new scientific evidence [7, 8] stressed the fact that reputation could be acquired in
a manner partially disconnected from the “actual trustworthiness” of our own social
partners. Thus, it became a very important issue to understand what happens when
reputation is derived from the feedbacks of other individuals (e.g., e-commerce sites) and
not from people’s actual behaviour as in some experimental settings [5]. Is well known
how individuals often use cognitive heuristics in their social decision making process [9],
and how such “algorithms” frequently appear to violate the principles of rationality [10,
11]. For what concern the social judgments, people internalize behavioural rules of thumb
from the very first years of life [12], and make their application automated. Moreover, as
pointed out by Postmes and Spears [13], when people interact within a virtual
environment, a psychological state defined as “de-individuation” could occur. In these
circumstances the sensitivity of the individuals to local norms (i.e., those environmental
signals that indicate which behaviour is appropriate and desirable in that context)
increases. Moreover, the anonymity and the physical isolation that characterize many
virtual interactions, have been found to push individuals to be more influenced by the set
of local norms (e.g., subjects’ reputation). Therefore, the aim of the present study was on
the one hand to investigate whether or not individuals behaved as rational agents during
reputational multiplayer online game (i.e., giving a positive feedback when they receive a
gain, and providing a negative feedback when they receive a damage, disregarding the
opponents’ reputation). On the other hand, we wanted to make more clear which factors
contribute to develop a good (or a bad) reputation during the virtual dynamics generated
by the game. In order to investigate such a dynamics, we developed a Bargaining game
with a reputation system, using the Google Script programming language. The game
asked the participants to provide an evaluation of their opponents after certain game
interactions, having clear their actual behaviour and current reputations.
2 Participants
The research was conducted respecting the guidelines for the ethical treatment of human
participants of the Italian Psychological Association (i.e., AIP). A total of 113 subjects
carried out entirely our experiment. 77 of them were adolescents (36 females) with an
average age of 16 (s.d. 1.28) and were recruited in a high school in Prato (IT). While, 36
of them were adults (19 females) with an average age of 21 (s.d. 1.88). Both adolescents
and adults were recruited through a complete voluntary census.
3 Methods and Procedures
Procedures and setting. The adolescents carried out the experiments in the computer
lab of their high-school, while the adult participants took part in the experimental
sessions in the computer lab of the Faculty of Psychology in Florence. Despite these two
samples accomplished the experiments in two different locations the procedures and the
lab environment were made as identical as possible. The participants seated at their
computer positions that were separated by the others by means of partitions. Moreover,
the subjects were strictly not allowed to talk one another and all the interaction between
them were made anonymously via computer. Before receiving their access data, the
instructions of the game were showed on the participants’ monitor and read aloud by the
experimenter as well.
Bargaining game. The game involved group of six players interacting one another for
45 rounds (15 in each role). In this game Receivers had to decide to accept or to decline a
deal (exchange of resources) proposed by another player (i.e., Donor). The Receivers
could only saw the amount and type of the resource offered by the Donor, but were
unaware of what and how much the Donor asked them in return. To take their decision
the Receivers could asked for a suggestion to an Observer that was identifiable only from
his reputation. Indeed, the Receivers’ available information about the Observers was
limited to their reputation score. Thus, the Receivers were fully unaware about the actual
Observer’s previous moves. The Receivers couldn’t select the Observer they wanted from
all the other players that were playing that role, but they were matched each turn with a
random Observer by our system. At the end of the game each Receiver was matched
exactly three times with each Observer. However, matching did not ensure that the
Receivers interacted (i.e., ask for a suggestion) with the matched Observer. Once the
Receiver’s decision has been taken, the Donor’s request is revealed. If the Receiver asked
for the Observer’s suggestion (to accept or to decline the Donor’s offer), he had the
opportunity to feedback the Observer and thus contribute to the Observer’s reputation.
We specify that the players could rate the observer only after becoming aware of the real
request of the Donor. In this way the receivers always knew if the observer had been
“fair” with them or not.
Data Analysis
The preconditions necessary for the inferential analyzes were verified on the
experiment’s data. For the continuous observables that were under investigation, the
normality of the distribution was assessed through the analysis of asymmetry and
kurtosis values. Due to the repeated measures structure of the experimental data, the
inferential analyses were conducted using a general linear mixed model (GLMM).
4 Results
To understand how reputation was attributed within our setting we focused our attention
to the feedback behaviour of the Receivers. Indeed, was through these actions (give a like
or a dislike) that the Observer’s reputation was built. Therefore, we analysed the
feedback behaviour by means of some generalized linear mixed models. The gender and
the age of the participants as well as the game-related observables (i.e., the goodness of
the suggestion provided, the previously acquired reputation) were all considered as
parameters.
For what concerned the game-related variables, we defined them as it follows:
The Observer provided a good suggestion when he suggested to refuse an offer
with a negative difference between the amount offered and the amount required in
return, and also when he suggested to accept a positive exchange offer. Instead,
suggest to the Receiver to accept a disadvantageous deal as well as to refuse a
positive one were classified as bad observations. A total of 810 suggestions have
been categorized as good suggestion while 421 as bad suggestions.
The Observer’s reputation was defined by the difference between the likes and the
dislikes received. Thus, a positive reputation was characterized by a positive
difference between these two feedbacks while a bad one by a greater number of
dislikes. In total 543 game records referred to negative reputational scores while
610 to good rated Observers.
To better represent the interaction between these two game-related variables and their
distribution in our sample, in Table 1 we presented the percentage of good and bad
suggestions for each reputation category (i.e., positive and negative).
Table 1.
Good and bad suggestions across reputational scores
Bad suggestion Good suggestion
Negative reputation 36.0% 64.0%
Positive reputation 30.5% 69.5%
The final and best model is reported in Table 2.
Table 2.
Generalized linear mixed models. Factors that influence the feedback behaviour of the
receivers.
GLMM best model LIKE
Model precision F Df­1(2)
Best model 24.515 2(317)
Fixed effects
Factor F Df­1(2)
Reputation 1(317)
Goodness of suggestion 1(317)
Parameter Coefficient (  ) Student t
Reputation(-)
Goodness of suggestion(-)
; Reputation (-): Bad reputation; Goodness of suggestion (-): Bad
suggestion.
Table 3.
Generalized linear mixed models. Factors that influence the feedback behaviour of the
receivers when they have received a good suggestion from the observer.
GLMM best model LIKE ­ Good suggestion received
Model precision F Df­1(2)
Best model 13.422 1(215)
Fixed effects
Factor F Df­1(2)
Reputation 1(215)
Parameter Coefficient (  ) Student t
Reputation(-)
; Reputation (-): Bad reputation.
The Age and the Gender of the participants did not seem to influence the feedback
behaviour of the Receiver neither directly nor trough interaction effects. Only two factor
appeared to contribute to define the Observers’ reputation. Specifically, good suggestions
and positive reputations drew more frequently a positive feedback from the others.
Conversely, providing a bad observation or having a bad reputational score, determined
less positive feedbacks and more negative ones. Interestingly, the standardized  seems
to highlight how Receivers could have been more affected in their feedback decision
making by the previous acquired reputation of their interactor instead of his actual
behaviour (i.e., the goodness of the suggestion received).
The influence exerted by the reputation on the Receivers’ judgment has been further
investigated through two other generalized linear mixed models. In each one of them we
selected only one typology of suggestion. The first model (Table 3) refers to those cases in
which the Receivers obtained good suggestions from the Observers, while the second one
(Table 4) considered only those situations in which the Observers provided bad
observations to the Receivers.
When the Observers provided a good suggestion, those of them with a good reputation
attracted more positive feedback from the others respect to those with a negative
reputational score (Table 3). The same pattern has been observed in those cases in which
the Observers’ suggestion damaged the Receivers (Table 4). Overall, for equal suggestion
received (i.e., identical actual behaviour) we observed a preference for those Observers
who gained previously a good reputation.
Table 4.
Generalized linear mixed models. Factors that influence the feedback behaviour of the
receivers when they have received a bad suggestion from the observer.
GLMM best model LIKE ­ Bad suggestion received
Model precision F Df­1(2)
Best model 12.325 1(101)
Fixed effects
Factor F Df­1(2)
Reputation 1(101)
Parameter Coefficient (  ) Student t
Reputation(-)
; Reputation (-): Bad reputation.
5 Discussion
Understand how reputation is constructed within a widespread feedback system, like the
ones used in e-commerce as well as in some crowdsourcing projects, is a major issue.
Indeed, reputation systems are actually considered as the most effective mechanism to
foster cooperation in virtual environments [14]. However, recent works suggested how
this process could be biased [7, 8]. Our work provided novel evidence about how
reputation is really “made” within such virtual environments. Differently from rational
agents, people are not only influenced in their judgments by the actual behaviour of their
interactor. Indeed, they seemed to be greatly affected also by the previous acquired
reputation of their social partner. In general, people preferentially rewarded (i.e.,
provided a positive feedback) individuals who gained in the past interactions a good
reputation and conversely punished (i.e., provided a negative feedback) more often
participants who obtained a bad reputational score. This feedback tendency is
maintained disregarding the actual behaviour of the social partner. Indeed, equally
1.
2.
trustworthy individuals (i.e., participants which shown the same suggestion behaviour)
are treated (i.e., feedbacked) differentially according to their reputational rating. To put
it simply, people seemed to use a sort of reputational “heuristics” to take a feedback
decision that violated rationality (i.e., appeared to be disconnected from the actual
behaviour). Our results highlighted a critical aspect of the use of reputational systems in
virtual environments. Indeed, given this feedback tendency, reputation appear to
preserve its state (i.e., to be maintained) even despite the actual behaviour of the social
partner. In other words, reputation appear to have an inertia. Not only that, initial
distinctions in reputation levels leaded to a different reputation rate grow. Indeed, good-
rated Observers acquired more easily further social rewards whether they helped or
damaged the Receivers respect to those Observers who were identified as bad partners.
The great influence exerted by reputation within a widespread feedback system appear in
line with de-individuation studies [13]. Indeed, reputation in such environments could
convey that important social information to which people are very sensitive. The
anonymity and the physical isolation that characterized such environments appear able
to trigger the reputation heuristics decision making. This process ends up in reinforcing
that social evaluations (i.e., reputation) that has been constructed by the whole group
through the widespread feedback system. In the end our results stressed the necessity to
further investigated the circumstances under which the reputation systems could work
properly.
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